Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 24

Issue 4

Article 2

1936

The Seventeenth Century Justice of Peace in England
James R. McVicker
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Legal History Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
McVicker, James R. (1936) "The Seventeenth Century Justice of Peace in England," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 24: Iss. 4, Article 2.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol24/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY JUSTICE OF PEACE IN
ENGLAND
By JAMES R. AMcVicE
In seventeenth century England, county government
largely devolved upon the justices of the peace. They were a
body of trained peace-magistrates who through the detection,
apprehension and prosecution of criminals functioned as the
agency of police control; who in the exercise of their judicial
powers on the criminal side in the county court of quarter sessions constituted the local magistracy; and who by the derivation of their authority acted as instruments of government by
the Crown. Justices were commissioned by the King and responsible to him for the maintenance of public order, for furtherance of the policies of the central government and for supervision of internal county affairs. Thus, the justices of that
time exercised wide powers of police, executive, administrative
and judicial authority, and constituted a unique institution for
the unification of national and local control.
In order to properly understand the status of the 17th century justices, it is necessary to see them in relation to other
county officers concerned with the keeping of the peace, viz.:
the Lord-Lieutenant, the Custos Rotulorum or "Keeper of the
rolls of the peace"," and the Clerk of the Peace, as well as in
their relation to the King's Judges and the Privy Council.
The office of Lord-Lieutenant originated as a military one,
and took its definite rise by statute in the middle of the 16th
century.2 Its duties included the mustering and organizing of
troops; its authority, the enforcement of martial law when neeessary. 3 In practice the office of Lord-Lieutenant became connected with another office which had arisen earlier, the Custos
Rotulorum. From at least the beginning of the 16th century,
this "keeper of the rolls" had been one of the leading justices
* Acting Prof. of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law;
B. S. 1902, Valparaiso Univ.; A. B. 1911, A. M. 1912, LL. B., 1913,
Ph. D. 1925, J. D. 1925, State Univ. of Iowa; LL. M. 1931, S. J. D. 1932,
Harvard Univ. Contributor to various legal periodicals.
137 Henry VIII, c. 1 (1546); Webb, English Local Government, I,
p. 286.
'4 and 5 P. and M., c. 3.
3Beard, The Office of Justice of the Peace in England, pp. 112, 113;
Maitland, Justice and Police, p. 82.
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of the county designated as such by the Crown. He was a member of the quorum in the commission, selected for "wisdom,
countenance, or credit.' '4 It was his duty to attend the sessions
in person or by deputy, to guard the records of the general sessions and to produce the writs, processes, indictments, recognizances and other records as required. 5 Somewhat before the
reign of William and Mary, and more so from the Revolution
onwards, the offices of Lord-Lieutenant and Custos Rotulorum
were united in one officer, though ordinarily -by separate appointments. Thus, this officer came to be regarded as the representative in the county of the King himself. 6 Known as LordLieutenant, this official personage came to be tlhe head of the
county magistracy, presiding over the justices and their sessions,
nominally for life. The office was usually filled by one of the
most important nobles owning land within the county. It was
greatly desired for it entailed little expense and few duties, but
carried with it a considerable honorary patronage and frequent
opportunities of official contact with the high officers of the
7
King.
While this dual officer in his civil capacity was custodian
of the court records, he was not the clerk of the sessions courts.
For this function there was provided another officer called the
Clerk of the Peace. He recorded the proceedings of the sessions; read indictments; drew processes; recorded the proclamations of wages, the discharges of apprentices, licenses to badgers and laders of corn, presentments for not attending church,
certificates of the oath of allegiance; certified transcripts of indictments and other records; and performed in general the numerous other clerical functions of a clerk of court.8 The Clerk of
the Peace attended sessions and performed his duties in person
or by deputy. Both the Clerk and his deputy were appointees
of the Lord-Lieutenant, and tenure was for the life of the appointing officer. The Clerk was usually a man of some legal
training or ability, and was called by Lambard "the attorney of
the King." 9 Differently than in the case of the magistracy, he
received customary fees of office.' 0
4
Lambard, Eirenarcha (1619 ed.), p. 387.
5Ibid.
0 Webb, op. cit. I, pp. 285-286.
TIbid. I, pp. 373, 483.
0Lam. Eir. p. 393.
91 Ibid, 394.
1Webb, op. cit. I, p. 304.
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There were also the King's Judges to whom, with the Privy
Council and the court of Star Chamber in the first half of the
century,'" the justices in their capacity as royal officers appointed by the King and removable at his pleasure were responsible. The King's Judges summarily removed cases from
the justices' jurisdiction, quashled their proceedings for mistakes
of law, and peremptorily ordered them to proceed in matters
wherein they were inactive. The King's Judges could try and
determine all accusations against justices for venal, malicious,
or even mistaken decisions. The justices and all other civil
officers of the county were bound by the law to appear before
the King's Judges at their periodical assizes in the county, and
to report to them on the state of the King's peace and the enforcement of the laws of the realm. By express terms of their
commissions, justices were bound to reserve difficult questions
for the presence of one of the King's Judges. 12
More especially as to administration, the justices were directly responsible to the Privy Council, whose primary local
functionaries they were. The King largely exercised his powers
through his Council; the Council in turn employed the justices
as an agency of control. The Council and justices constantly
communicated on all local matters, especially those affecting the
royal interests. The Council supervised the securing of willing
and faithful justices to perform the orders and execute the policies of the King's government.' 3
The justices themselves as we find them in the 17th century, were the product of history. Their office extends in its
origins from the assignment of knights to assist in -conserving
the peace by the Justiciar, Archbishop Hubert Walter, in 1195,
through the successive experiments of the central government
in appointments of similar custodians or conservators of the
peace for about a century and a half thereafter. 14 These experiments, with those made in the institution of justices of laborers ensuing upon the plague of the Black Death in 1349, led
up to and resulted in th.e final consolidation of the conservators
of the peace and the justices of laborers in the permanent esnIbid, p. 306; Lam. Eir. pp. 513-516; 1 Holdworth, History of
English Law, p. 297.
12Lam. Eir. pp. 49-50; Beard, op. cit. pp. 143, 170; Webb, op. cit.
p. 306.
"Beard, op. cit. pp. 114-124; W bb, op. cit. I, p. 306.
"'Beard, op. cit. pp. 17-40; 1 Holdsworth, op. cit. pp. 286-287.
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tablishment of the office of justice of the peace in 1360.1 5 The
statute of 1360 is regarded as the foundation of the jurisdiction
of the county courts of quarter sessions and of the office of justice of the peace as a permanent police and administrative instittion. 16 Two years later, in directing the holding of the
quarter sessions, the statute itself called these officers justices of
the peace.' 7
The fundamental charter of the justices' powers, their
royal commission,' 8 was revised into its final form in 1590.
Prior thereto it had become unnecessarily long and equivocal.
To remedy this, the form of the commission was revised by the
Chief Justice of the King's Bench, Sir Christopher Wray, in
conference with the other judges and with the approval of the
Lord Chancellor. It was then put into simple general terms,
easily including later arising details.' 9 This has remained the
final form under which the justices of that time and their suc20
cessors for all time since have served.
The revised commission was virtually a charter of the fundamental law in force relating to the authority and jurisdiction
of justices of the peace.2 ' In its several provisions, it first assigned the certain persons named to jointly and severally keep
the peace in their counties. The first clause conveyed the powers of conservators of the peace according to both common and
statute law. 22 The second clause conferred upon any two or
more justices, one being of the quorum, power to inquire by
jury into a list of specified offenses against the statutes and into
official neglect, to try indicted offenders, and to fine or sentence
convicted persons. 23 The quorum proviso that for the validity
of proceedings one of the justices must be of the select group
whose names were expressly repeated in the commission as being
- 34 Edw. 3, c. 1; Beard, op. cit. p. 40; 1 Holdsworth, op. cit. p. 288.
I'll Stephen, History of Criminal Law of England, p. 113; Beard,

op. cit. p. 40.

1 36 Edw. 3, c. 12; Lam. Eir. p. 23.

2 The term "commission" is used in two different connections, in
the first sense as meaning the whole body of magistrates appointed in
the county, and in the second sense as the charter of the offciers' appointment and authority issued from the Chancery.
"Lam. Eir. pp. 35-39, pp. 43-45.
5 Reeves, History of English Law, p. 467.
2 Beard, op. cit. p. 142.
"1Ibid, p. 168; Lam. Eir. p. 45.
2 Lam. Mir. p. 36, pp. 48-49; Beard, op. cit. pp. 142, 168.
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learned in the law, was in conformity to early statutes. 24 Another provision reserved cases of doubt and difficulty for
consideration by the justices when there should be present with
them one of the King's judges. 25 The justices were charged to
be diligent in performance of duty, with a saving of amercements to the King.20 The final provisions commanded the
sheriff to return the jury upon the certain days and at the places
to be designated by the justices, and concluded with instructions
to the Custos Rotulorum, to produce at court from his custody
the records of the peace, such as the writs, proceedings, and in2
dictments. 7
It was early determined that justices were not to be elected
locally, nor appointed by Parliament, but that they were to be
"named by the King and his continual Council."128 Later, a
statute provided that they should be appointed by the advice
of the Chancellor and the King's Council.2 9 It was and is the
custom to issue a new commission for the county from time to
time, especially at the beginning of each new reign, or to insert
new names in the old commission.3" The high standing of the
office made appointment on the commission an object of desire.
Influence and the personal and social standing of candidates
necessarily entered into the procuring of appointments. 31
Down to the Rebellion, the Judges of Assize were expected by
the Privy Council to nominate suitable justices. After the
Restoration, there followed a period of courtly manipulation of
the commissions in which there were removals from and additions
to the lists according to individual disaffection or subserviency.
Gradually, the practice obtained of appointing justices on the
nomination of the Lord-Lieutenant of the county, who thus
exercised his influence in the award of patronage, although the
Lord Chancellor always retained his right to appoint persons
32
of his own choice.
18 Edw. 3, c. 42; 34 Edw. 3, c. 1; 13 Ric. 3, c. 7; 1 Holdsworth,
op. cit. p. 290.
3Lam. Eir. p. 38, pp. 49-50; Beard, op. cit. p. 143, pp. 169-171.
"Lam. Eir. p. 39.
0Ibid, pp. 39, 51.
"Rot. Parl. ii, 333a; Beard, op. cit. pp. 42-44, n. 1; Peyton, Intro.
Qr. Sessions Records County of Northampton, Vol. I, xiv.
0 2 Hen. V. st. 2, c. 1.
Lam. Eir. p. 27; Maitland, op. cit. pp. 82, 83.
Eir. 30-32; Beard, op. cit. 'pp. 140-141; Peyton, op. cit. xv.
'Lam.
Webb, op. cit. I, pp. 379-381; 18 Hen. VI, c. 11.
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The qualifications of a justice were a practical consideration.
As to character, he must be "a good man and lawful, "' "cof
the best reputation, "34 "the most worthy,' 35 and in Lambard's
rendering, "the most valiant." (Eir. 30.) Respect of the law
would be best promoted by officers of good example. 3 6 A: residential qualification limited appointments to be made of "the
most sufficient persons dwelling in the county,''3 7 as it was undesirable that outsiders should interfere in the administration
of the county. 38 As to property, a justice must have lands or
tenements to the value of £20 a year, for as the preamble of the
law states, otherwise the temptation offered to men of small
means for bribery and extortion interferes with the purposes of
the institution. 39 In the absence of substantial persons to meet
this requirement, the Chancellor could appoint other discreet
persons "learned in the law" even if they did not possess this
40
income.
In order to understand the records and handle proceedings
before them, justices needed a certain knowledge of Latin and
a certain knowlege of law.4 1 To safeguard the legality of justices' actions, members of the commission who were of the quorum
were required by statute to know law.42 It was necessary that
such a member be present as one of the two or more justices in
the determination of cases, and usually in the transaction of
administrative business as well. 43 In time it became the practice
to place all, or nearly all, of the justices of the commission in
the select quorum group. 44 By 1689, the quorum clause became
1 Edw. III, c. 16.
"18 Edw. III, c. 2.
"34 Edw. III, c. 1.
"Peyton, op. cit. v.
312 Hen. V, st. 2, c. 1; Lam. Eir. 30.
"Peyton, op. cit. xv.
918 Hen. VI, c. 11. Owing to the later depreciation of money,
this qualification became practically nugatory. Lambard conjectures
(Eir. pp. 31-32) that in his time its inadequacy was met by the selection of men whose incomes were proportionately increased.
'3 Ibid.
"Hamilton, Quarter Sessions from Queen Elizabeth to Queen
Anne, p. 347; Peyton, op. cit. xvi; 18 Edw. III, c. 1; 34 Edw. III, c. 1;
13 Ric. III, c. 7.
42 Lam. Eir. p. 48;
Beard, op. cit. p. 146.
"Peyton, op. cit. xlvii.
"1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Cooley ed.
p. 351.
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a mere form; all justices in each commission being named as of
45
the quorum.
Because of the dignity and honorable esteem with which
the office was regarded, justices possessed of the practical ability and learning could usually be obtained by selection from
a large group of candidates among the landed gentry. It was
part of a country gentleman's education to read law for two or
46
three years at the Inns of Court in London.
Upon issuance of the commission, justices appointed were
required to take oath in order to qualify as active justices of the
peace. "To take out their Dedimus Potestatem," as it was
known, involved going before an officer authorized to administer
the oaths by a writ of dedimus potestatem directed out of the
Chancery with, the commission. The oaths in Lambard's time
included the official oath of a justice of the peace, an oath of
supremacy or ecclesiastical allegiance, and an oath of political
allegiance to the Sovereign.4 7 For this, the justice was put out
4
of pocket for fees to the amount of about f4. 8
The tenure of office was usually for life. While it was legal9
ly for the life of the Sovereign and his death thus determined it,4
in practice, the policy of the Lord Chancellor was to continue the
name of a magistrate on the list for his county,50 and he would
therefore be reappointed. The long service of justices produced
a body of trained magistrates. However, the prevailing fixity
of tenure was accompanied by the possibility of quick removal.
For the unusual instances of this, all that was necessary was the
issuance of a new commission leaving undesirable members off
the list. Individual justices could thus be removed by the Lord
Chancellor for refusal to attend to complaints, for delay, or any
serious misconduct. 51
The number of justices for each county varied in different
periods. In 1360, one lord and three or four of the most worthy
were assigned; in 1388, six justices were allotted to each shire;
in 1390, the number was increased to eight, after which time no
Webb, op. cit. I, p. 303.
"Hamilton, op. cit., p. 347.
"Lam. Eir., pp. 53-56.
Webb, op. cit., I, p. 303.
Lam. Eir., pp. 69-70.
"Webb, op. cit., I, pp. 380-381.
54 Hen. VII, c. 12; Peyton, op. cit., xiv.

L. J.-4
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further statutory regulation was made. 2 By necessity, with
the increase of population and the multiplication of duties imposed upon the office, additional justices were appointed from
time to time and it came about that no fixed or traditional number of justices was set for each county. 53 By the 17th century
as many as fifty or more justices were named on the commission for a county in addition to the names of men included in
54
an honorary capacity.
The commission of appointment bore the names of a large
number of persons who did not in fact serve as justices. In the
flrst place, it was the custom to place on it the names of a considerable number of dignitaries, such as the highest officials of
the central government, the highest judicial officers, the judges
of the King's Bench, of the Common Pleas and of Assize."5 In
the second place, the commission bore the names of a considerable number of other persons in the county who could have actively served, but who did not choose to do so and did not qualify
by taking the oaths. Moreover, a large number who actually
qualified did not devote themselves to the service. An estimate
of the activity of the 2,500 to 3,000 appointees in the seventy
or eighty commissions in force between 1650 and 1700, states
that probably not over half would have qualified as justices,
and that of those who had qualified, not over half can be supposed to have habitually devoted themselves to the work. Of
the 3,000 appointed justices in the last half of the 17th century,
not over 700 to 800 are supposed to have actively served as
such and were probably inversely distributed as the need for
56
their presence existed.
When due allowance is made for the necessary deductions
of inactive appointees and justices on the commission, it appears that in practice the burden fell on the few most willing
or able to serve. Earlier in the century this condition would
seem to have been in accord with the apparent policy of the
Privy Council, 51 yet in 1665 the Lord Chancellor complains of
534 Edw. I1, c. 1; 12 Ric.
cit., xvi.
3Peyton, op. cit., xvi, xvii;
pp. 32-34.
54
Saunders, Official Papers
Ibid.; and xix-xx, pp. 33,
348.
Webb, op. cit., I, p. 321.
1 Saunders, op. cit., xx-xxi.

II, c. 10; 14 Ric. II, c. 11; Peyton, op.
Beard, op. cit., pp. 146-147; Lam. Eir.,
of Sir Nathaniel Bacon, pp. 33-36.
34, 36; Hamilton, op. cit., 3-4, pp. 321-
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the inactivity of many persons of the commission who neglect
to be sworn, and threatens proceedings against them by the Attorney-General.5 8 The threat was unheeded and apparently
never enforced.5 0 As the commission was an honor in itself,
their
many persons in attaining it achieved sufficiently thereby
60
desire, and did not care to assume its responsibilities.
In the honor of the office, and not in the pecuniary compensation afforded them, lay the rewards of the justices. The
wages of the justices were but four shillings a day for attendance at regular sesions, limited to three days each, and limited
in the number who could receive payment to eight justices. It
was further provided that peers of the realm serving as justices
could not receive payment. 61 'For attendance at the sessions to
be held twice a year, not exceeding three days each, for administration of the Statute of Laborers, justices were to be paid
five shillings a day.6 2 A few other small perquisites provided
were: (1) a part of the goods seized in possession of "Egyptians"; 6 3 (2) half the twelve pence fee received for taking
recognizance from an alehouse keeper; 64 (3) a fee of one to two
and a half shillings according to value for enrollment of a
bargain and sale-often avoided by the process of "lease and
release" ;65 (4) half the penalty of forty shillings for the refusal
to serve of one appointed as overseer of cloth. 66 It is considered doubtful that justices benefited to any extent from the
latter provision. The trifling payments made little difference
to the principle of gratuitous service.6 7 The wisdom of the
property qualification for holders of the justices' office is readily
seen.
The more substantial rewards of the service were found in
the benefits of its honorary status, and in the attainment of
political prestige. The practical training received in the actual
work of government fitted justices for efficient service as mem68Bohn, The Justice of the Peace: His Calling, vii, xiv.
"Webb, op. cit., I, pp. 303, 321.
'Alexander, The Administration of Justice in Criminal Matters in
England and Wales, p. 70.
"12 Ric. II, c. 12; 14 Ric. II, c. 11.
"5 Eliz., c. 4, s. xxxi.

22 Hen. VIII, c. 10.
5 Edw. VI, c. 25.
'Pollock, The Land Laws, pp. 105-107; 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16.
" 3-4 Edw. VI, c. 2, s. 12,
"Peyton, op. cit., xli.
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bers of Parliament.6" The experience and public recognition
gained by the justices promoted their influence and directly
contributed to their political opportunities.
The sphere of the justices' activity extended throughout
their own counties. 69 Within these boundaries, they served to
administer justice from a first-hand knowledge of local conditions, to suit the general control of local government to the personal elements or details of its administration, to suppress
smouldering embers of discontent and protect the safety of the
Crown.1 0 Hence, the office of justice of the peace was one of
broadly inclusive functions, the sources of which were to be
found partly in the commission and in customary development,
but more especially in the statutes which added to the number
and miscellaneous character of the justices' duties. 1
The justices were primarily police officers. From the early
conservators of the peace whose functions were those of constable on a larger scale with regard to suppressing disturbances
and apprehending offenders, 72 this attribute of the office has
always survived, and was retained in the final form of the commission.1 3 Such police duties were greatly augmented by a
long line of enactments prior to and especially during the Tudor
reigns.1 4 In the exercise of its control over justices, the Privy
Council in the 17th Century increased their duties by imposing
upon them further police burdens in connection with the enforcement of measures relating to the social and political order
1 5
as well as those relating to recusants and dissenters.
In the apprehension of offenders, a justice could exercise a
large power of police control through, his authority to command
others, and he could himself make an arrest for a felony or
breach of the peace committed in his presence. 1 6 But it seems
that the statutes did not expressly give justices more power
611 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 292.

192 Hale, P. C., p. 50; Beard, op. czt., p. 147.
"Peyton, op. cit., xvii.
1 Holdsworth, op. cit., pp. 289-290.
72 1 Edw. III, s. 2, c. 16; 34 Edw. III, c. 1, clauses 2-6; Lam. Eir.,
p. 20; 1 Stephen, op. cit., p. 112, 216; Beard, op. cit., p. 165.
78Clause 1, Commission of the Peace, after 1590; Beard, op. cit.,
pp. 142, 168; Lam. Eir., pp. 45-46.
"Beard, op. cit., pp. 58-71, 59, 66, 100-107.
5Beard, op. cit., pp. 124-138; Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 74, 81, 164,
196-198, 234, 258, 295.
7"2
Hale, P. C., pp. 86-87; Lam. Mir., pp. 45, 35-36; Beard, op. cit.,
pp. 142, 168.
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over the apprehension of felons than that possessed by private
persons to arrest criminals, which was the power to arrest persons actually committing, or who had actually committed a
felony, or to arrest persons suspected on reasonable grounds of
having actually committed a felony.7 8 However, the issuance
of warrants of arrest of justices of the peace had grown up and
gradually extended throughout England.
The power of justices of the peace to issue warrants of arrest
came not by virtue of statute, but seems to have come about by
a practice begun and found so useful that it took firm root and
spread as a common law practice over the country. No dates are
therefore assignable for the origin nor for the definite establishment of this practice. It may be supposed that as the justices
became more and more an efficient agency of local control, their
authority increasingly flourished in the minds of the people
who looked to them for leadership in the apprehension of criminals. The device of a written, precept would be useful in the
prosecution of the hue and cry after felons from one jurisdiction to another, especially on the authority whereby it had been
raised. At all events it came about that the hue and cry was
ordinarily raised under the authority of a justice's warrant, and
the phrase "to grant a hue and cry" came into common use by
some time in the 17th century to mean the issuance of a warrant
of arrest by a justice of the peace. 7 9 Such warrant provided
not only unquestionable authority for the raising and pursuit
of the hue and cry, but it carried with it for pursuers immunity
from their acts in arresting suspected persons encountered,
whether or not a crime was found to actually have been committed.8 0
The legality of the use of warrants was long disputed, es781 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 294.
71'1 Stephen, op. cit., p. 190; 1 Holdsworth, op. cit., pp. 294-295;
3 Holdsworth, op. cit., pp. 601-603.
1"2 Hale, P. C., pp. 100-103. The conception of the justice's warrant according to Hale is that of a magisterial precept issued upon
careful determination as the initial step in prosecution. In keeping
with this view, Hale stressed the examination of a person charging a
felony as one to be made upon oath touching the whole matter, and
the necessity of reducing such examination to writing as preliminary
to the issuance of a warrant. Such complainant was also to be bound
by reoognizances to prosecute at the next sessions or assizes (page
111). Subsequent writers approved Hale's view, sustaining it both in
the matter of public policy and on fundamental principle. See 4 Blackistone, op. cit., p. 290, and 1 Chitty, Criminal Law (1826), pp. 13-14.
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pecially in the case of the arrest of persons suspected of felony
before their indictment, unless the suspicion had originated in
the mind of the officer or person making the arrest. Practice
to the contrary was admitted by both Lambard and Coke, however. 8 ' But by the time of Hale (1609-1676) the great convenience and even necessity of the practice of the justice's warrant
had resulted in its customary use and firm entrenchment. Hale
justified its use as the legal exercise of a judicial power residing
82
in a justice of the peace.
8 Lamn. Eir., pp. 188-189; 4 Coke, Inst. (1809 ed.), pp. 176-177.
Coke's dates were 1552-1634. He held the resolution of the court in
14 Ien. VIII, f.16, a, to be the law to the effect that "a justice of the
peace could not make a warrant to take a man for felony, unless he be
indicted thereof, and that must be done in open sessions of the peace.
For the justice himself cannot arrest one for felony, unless he himself suspect him (as any other may) and by the same reason he cannot
make a warrant to another". He carried his reasons back to the constitutional rights of individuals granted by Magna Carta and the law
of the land, and contended that the statutes of 1 and 2 Phil. and Mary,
c. 13 (1554), and 2 and 3 Phil. and Mary, c. 10 (1555), providing as to
bail in suspected felony and other cases on examination of such prisoners before justices, authorized only a warrant to a constable to preserve the peace while the person having the suspicion himself arrested
the accused, merely "to assist the party that knoweth or hath suspicion
of the feloiy," and that it did not even authorize breaking open any
one's house to effect the arrest in such case.
22 Hale, P. C., pp. 105-110, 80, 91, 579. Hale took issue with Coke:
"My lord Coke in his jurisdiction of courts . . . hath delivered certain
tehets, which, if they should hold to be the law, would much abridge
the power of justices of the peace, and condemn the constant and useful practice, and give a loose to felons to escape unpunished in most
cases. . . The opinion of my lord Coke, 4th Inst. 177, is too straitlaced in this case, and, if it should be received, would obstruct the
peace and good order of the kingdom; and the book of 14 H. 8, 16, upon
which he grounded his opinion, was no solemn resolution, but a sudden and extrajudicial opinion, and the defendant had liberty to mend
his plea as to the circumstafices of time, to the end it might be judicially settled by demurrer, which was 4ever done; and the constant
practice hath obtained, contrary to that opinion; quo, vide Dalt. cap.
117." Hale went further into the matter to show that the practice was
not in contravention of the law to which Magna Carta required judicial
procedure and process to conform, nor of such later laws as that providing that "no man shall be put to answer without presentment before justices or matter of record, or by due process and writ original
according to the old law of the land." (Magna Carta, c. 29; 42 Edw. 3,
c. 3.) He maintained that inasmuch as it was always the law of the
land that if a felony was committed, or was suspected to have been
committed, a man could be arrested by a man who knew him to be, or
upon probable grounds suspected him to be the felon, or by a constable
upon complaint, or upon hue and cry, that therefore a justice's warrant or preparatory process having only the same effect as other existing modes of arrest was not in reason nor in fact illegal. He goes on
to support his stand by citing the statutes enlarging the powers of
justices as conservators of the peace and sustaining the principle contended for. He shows the judicial competence of a justice to judge of
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The preliminary inquiry in criminal cases as conducted by
justices in the 17th century was very different from the examination of accused persons as conducted in England and America
today. The early law held accused persons for trial on presentment of the grand jury or on the finding of a coroner's inquest,
and did not allow for any inquiry before trial on the question
of guilt or innocence.83 In the 17th century, preliminary inquiry was based on the statutes of Philip and Mary.8 4 These
did not contemplate any judicial inquiry for the benefit of the
accused. The design, insofar as such persons were concerned,
was to arm the justices with greater powers against them.85
The conduct of the justices was clearly defined. In the case
of a prisoner charged or suspected of felony before them, it was
first incumbent upon the justices to take the sworn information
or accusations by the prosecutor and witness, reduced to writing,
and the written but unsworn examination of the person accused.5 0 In the case of a prisoner expressly charged with felony
upon oath, justices had no power to discharge him in any event,
but had either to bail or commit him. However, if the accused
were charged only with suspicion of felony and no felony in
fact proved to have been committed, or if the fact charged
constituted no felony in point of law hut only trespass, the
justices might discharge him as to felony. In the latter case
he would probably be bound over to sessions for a trespass if
the facts so warranted. For killing by accident or in self-defense, or for assaulting an officer of justice in the performance
of his duty, though not felony, the prisoner had to undergo trial
and was committed or bailed meantime.8 7 But little margin of
the reasonableness of the grounds of the complaint on suspicion, and
demonstrates the soundness of the principle of the justice's adoption
of the suspicion as his own in the issuance of an arrest warrant, just
as a constable might act in his police capacity in arresting upon complaint made to him in such cases. Thus two propositions were upheld: (1) "That a justice of the peace hath power to issue a warrant
to apprehend a person accused of felony, though not yet indicted";
(2) "He may also issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of
felony, though the original suspicion be not in himself."
"I Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 296.
811 and 2 Phil. and Mary, c. 13 (1554); 2 and 3 Phil. and Mary,
c. 10 (1555).
151 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 296. Cf. 1 Stephen, op. cit., pp. 237-238.
1 1 and 2 Phil. and Mary, c. 13; 2 and 3 Phil. and Mary, c. 10;
2 Hale, P. C., p. 120.
Ibid., p. 121.
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determination existed to be exercised in the discharge of a prisoner, and that little was required to be grounded upon proof
of no crime in fact.
In examination of the prisoner and of the witnesses against
him by the justices, they took more the manner of a prosecutor
than of a judicial officer This was in line with their police
function, and is shown in the frequent employment by justices
of methods now exercised by detective officers.8 8 A multitude
of cases are to be found in the sessions records going to prove
the statement that "The great object of an English justice then,
as of a French procureur now, was to get a confession." 8 9 The
proceedings in these examinations were of an inquisitorial character. They were secret and were intended only for the use of
the prosecution and the court. The prisoner on the one hand,
and his accuser and prosecuting witnesses on the other, were examined apart. The defendant was not permitted to be present
at nor to be represented by counsel in the examination of his
accusers, and in fact he was to be kept in ignorance of the testimony against him up to the moment of his trial. Furthermore,
in many instances wherein justices worked up the case against
8 1 Stephen, op. cit., pp. 193, 221. This procedure is partly illustrated in the Indictment Books of the West Riding Sessions Records.
Not infrequently in marginal notes in these records, after the word "witness" is written "confession" and sometimes the wora "examination".
This means that upon his being arrested and brought before a justice
by the constable, the accused was subjected to examination and questioning much in the same manner as is now practiced upon the continent, the chief object being to get the prisoner to confess. (Lister,
West Riding Sessions Records, II, vii-viii.) The ule of torture to
wring confessions from accused persons was commonly practiced in
the reigns of Elizabeth and James I, but in 1617 Lord Coke in Peacham's case and in 1628 the Judges in Felton's case declared such practice illegal. Whether it was ever a means employed to get sessions
prisoners to confess is uncertain, but it seems clear that justices
deemed it their duty to obtain confessions from aedused persons, if
possible. (Bund, Worcestershire County Records, I, cxi-cxii.) The
words, "and further he confesseth not," are the usual ending of the
records of these examinations, even when the accused has confessed
nothing at all. Other statements as to the use of totture in the 16th
century may be found in Beard, op. cit., p. 129, and in Domestic
Papers, 1591-1594, p. 297.
8 It is further observed by Mr. Bund, the editor of the Worcestershire County Records (p. cxii), that "it is a curious fact in the legal
history of the country how in two-and-a-half centuries the ideas as to
prisoners being questioned has so completely changed that a proposal
to allow them, if they desired it, to give evidence o4 oath was for a
long time most strenuously opposed as being too hard upon the
prisoners."
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a prisoner, the justices were not infrequently among the principal witnesses against him.90

We now come to the matter of recognizances and bail which
is closely related to that of preliminary examination. Justices
were accustomed to determine from the accusation and examination whether the suspicion or presumption of guilt was great or
small. If the latter case, the accused who was but lightly suspected of felony might be admitted to bail, but even then the prisoner might be committed to jail unless he himself tendered bail,
justices not being first bound to demand it.91 In the cases of
great presumption of guilt, especially those on heinous charges
or of offenders taken with the mainour, the only course for the
justices was to commit the prisoner to jail to be there held for
92
trial until the sitting of the assizes.
From earliest times in their character of police officers,
justices took recognizances from numerous persons and for various purposes. 93 The ordinary recognizance was a formal instrument or bond in the nature of an admission of record that the
parties bound owed to the King the sums therein admitted to be
due, and that they would pay the sums fixed in case a condition
stipulated in the bond was not performed. These conditions required additional persons as sureties. Most of these instruments
were for the purpose of securing appearance of persons at
sessions: (1) to answer some charge that should there be made
against them; or (2) to prosecute some person charged with an
offense; or (3) to give evidence. 94 It is likely that in the 17th
century the most usual act justices had to perform was the taking
of a recognizance in a case wherein a person was bound over to
appear at sessions to answer to some charge there to be made,
and to insure his good beh.avior and bearing toward the keeping
of the peace. 95
"1 Stephen, op. cit., pp. 221-228; 1 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 297.
'32 Hale, P. C., pp. 123-124.
'Axon, Manchester Quarter Sessions, 1616-1643, I, x; 7- Bacon's
Works (Spedding ed.), pp. 469-471.
3Beard, op. cit., p. 165.
4 In the Calendar of the Quarter Sessions Papers of the Worcestershire County Records, Vol. I (1591-1643), 5,780 documents are calendared. Of these, 3,077 are recognizances, 993 indictments, and 1,800
miscellaneous documents. Of the 3,077 recognizances, 2,933 bonds, or
over 95 per cent., were taken for appearances to answer, to prosecute,
or to give evidence at sessions. (Bund, op. cit., xi-xvi.)
'"Bund, op. cit., xv.
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While single justices exercised the power of taking recognizances in a great variety of situations, the matter of admission to bail of those accused of felony was one standing on an
entirely different plane. The regulation of admission to bail
had been one of considerable concern in English law for several
centuries. The abuses of discretionary power regarding bail by
the sheriffs was recited in and regulated by the Statute of Westminister, I (1275), which for about 550 years thereafter was
basic in the law of bail, especially in defining the classes of
offenders which could be and those which could not be bailed.9
The matter was finally regulated by a more stringent statute in
1554.97
If the prisoner, as in most cases, were held to answer to
the court, and if, as probably in most cases, he were not admitted to bail, he was then usually committed to the common jail of
963 Edw. I, c. 12. See I Stephen, op. cit., pp. 234, 236, 237; and
Lam. Eir., pp. 342-343. Even after this statute the sheriff's abuse of
power and exactions relating to bail continued and probably contributed to the causes of the transference of his power over bail largely
to the justices, by several statutes. A statute of 1330 prohibited the
sheriff from admitting to mainprise (or bail) persons indicted or taken
by the keepers of the peace. (4 Edw. III, c. 1.) The statute of 1360
gave in general terms the power of bail to justices. (34 Edw. III, c. 1.)
The statute of 1444 required the sheriff to admit persons to bail in
certain cases. (23 Hen. VI, c. y., c. 9.) It seems that the power to bail
under the statute of 1360, as exercised by justices, also worked unsatisfactorily, and even after an intermediate statute of 1485 empowering
every justice to admit to bail those only suspected of felony as well as
those indicted, it was found in 1488 that single justices improperly
admitted to bail many murderers and felons who thereby escaped.
(1 Ric. III, c. 3.) The new statute gave the power to bail-to the next
sessions or assizes-to two justices, one being of the quorum. (3 Hen.
VII, c. 3.) Even this worked unsatisfactorily in practice, for whereas
formerly one justice might admit to bail any offender on any security
whereby it might, and*often did, result in the complete impunity of
offenders; so now a collusive justice by the, using or "borrowing" of
another's name coupled with his own might insecurely admit to bail
persons as though they were but lightly sspected but who were
really chargeable with felony and who thereby escaped.
"The statute of 1 and 2 Philip and Mary (c. 13) which prescribed
the mode of preliminary inquiry was intended to guard against any
collusion between justices and prisoners. The statute provided that
before a prisoner be admitted to bail his examination and the depositions of his accusers be taken in writing and certified to the next
jail delivery (or court). It also provided that no one arrested for
manslaughter, or felony, or for suspicion of either, even if bailable by
law, should actually be admitted to bail by any justice of the peace
except in open sessions. In case of admission to bail out of sessions
the statute required the presence of two justices at least, one being
of the quorum, to be together at the time of the bailment, and that
each should subscribe and certify it in his own handwriting. See
Lam. Eir., pp. 343-344; and 1 Stephen, op. cit., p. 237.

JUSTICE O THE PEACE IN ENGIAND

the county. The mittimus or warrant of commitment directing
the jailer to hold the prisoner in custody to abide the order of
the court was required to be in writing and under seal of the
justices. WVhile the justices were allowed a reasonable time,
varying in several days for the conduct of the examination, their
power of further detention upon its completion was only for
long enough to enable them to issue the mittimus.9 8 This had
to be specific as to the nature of the felony charged, for the
scrutiny of the judges of the King's Bench in a possible habeas
corpus proceeding, and to provide information needed for the
sheriff's calendar of prisoners and charges pending. 99 The written examinations and depositions, whether in the case of a prisoner admitted to bail or in the case of one committed to jail, also
constituted an essential part of the record of the eases. Verified
and certified as prescribed by law, at the conclusion of the examination, these were required to be returned to the proper
court.o00
Another important function of the justices was their performance as judicial officers. This came permanently into being
with the establishment of the justices' office by the provisions
of 34 Edward III, which, is regarded as the foundation of the
jurisdiction of the county courts of quarter sessions.10 1 The
judicial powers of justices subsequently developed very rapidly
by statute, and their general scope is indicated in the second
clause of the commission giving instructions for the holding of
sessions.' 0 2 Justices of the peace in the 17th century were judges
of record; the county courts of sessions were then as now courts
of record.1 0 3 It was the duty of the Clerk to record the proceedings with great care, so as to be capable of proof after term
time ended.' 0 4
The courts held by the justices of the peace in the 17th century functioned in three kinds of sessions: (1) the courts of
quarter or general sessions of the peace; (2) discretionary ses" 2 Hale, P. C., pp. 120-122.
0 Ibid.

1 and 2 Phil. and Mary, c. 13; 2 and 3 Phil. and Mary, c. 10.
"134 Edw. III, c. 1 (1360); Lam. Eir., pp. 21-23; 1 Stephen, op. cit.,
p. 113; Beard, op. cit., pp. 40-41; 1 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 293.
2 Lam. Eir., pp. 36, 48; Beard, op. cit., pp. 142, 168-169.
2"Lam. Elr., pp. 64-66; Alexander, The Administration of Criminal Justice, p. 78.
20'Lam. Eir., pp. 63-64, 392-393.
'1
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sions being courts of general sessions; (3) special sessions of
more restricted character. The courts of quarter sessions were
the regular courts provided to be held for the whole county four
times a year, quarterly as the name implies and at times fixed
by statute. 105 It is seen that the statutes authorized extra sessions to be held at other times than those fixed, and these sessions
were called at will by the justices and could be convened by any
two of them, one being of the quorum, by a precept issued to
the sheriff requiring him to summon the personnel for the sessions.' 0 6 Hence, these extra sessions held at a place and time
directed in the writ convening them, are called discretionary
sessions. These also were justices' courts of general sessions,
called sessions of the peace or simply sessions, and having the
same general powers and jurisdiction as quarter sessions with
some exceptions. The procedure and organization of discretionary sessions and quarter sessions were also the same. 10 7 The
special sessions were also called at the discretion of any two
justices, one being of the quorum, to be held in certain localities
in the county and at times between general sessions. The purpose of such sessions was mainly for the transaction of th.e
special business for Which they were called, although they could
probably take up all matters within their commission which the
statutes prescribed to be taken up at "sessions" in the use of
the word "indifferently." They were not to burden the- county
in service but with the aid of a jury from the hundred in which
they were held, they could advisably perform the functions of a
petty court in delivering the jails of misdemeanants, unruly
08
servants, vagabonds, petty thieves, and the like.
In its organization, the court of quarter sessions or its dis1

. The times for holding quarter sessions were set to be within
the first week each after the Feast of St. Michael, Epiphany, the close
of Easter, and the translation of St. Thomas the Martyr, and oftener it
need required. The quarter sessions were also termed "principal
sessions" and "open sessions". (12 Ric. II, c. 10; 2 Hen. V, c. 4; 4 Hen.
VII, c. 12; 27 Eliz., c. 19.)
:°1The number of "standing sessions of the peace" summoned
yearly varied from six to sixteen in some counties according to Lambard (Eir., p. 593). "Monthly meetings" seem to have been held in
Worcestershire, usually attended by three or four magistrates. (Bund.,
op. cit., xxxi.)
"I Lam. Eir., pp. 378-382, 605; Beard, op. cit., pp. 158-162; Peyton
op. cit., xxxviii.
1
"Lam. Eir., pp. 623-625; Beard, op. cit., 158-162; Peyton, op. cit.,
xxxviii.
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cretionary meetings called "session" or "sessions of the peace,"
was practically simple. The personnel of the sessions included
the following: Two or more justices of the peace including one
of the quorum, the Custos Rotulorum or his deputy, the clerk
of the peace or his authorized deputy, the coroners, the sheriff
with the precept returned, the bailiffs of franchises as ministers
of the court, the constables of hundreds as jurors, stewards,
the twenty-four honest and lawful men from each hundred, and
twenty-four knights and other honest and lawful men of th.e
shire at large, being summoned as jurors, and other persons
voluntarily attending as a privilege, whether they were of those
bound to keep the peace and required to appear, or citizens attending of their own accord. The clerical official known as
the Ordinary was expected to attend only when called for matters of clergy.' 0 s The officially summoned members of this
personnel constituted the machinery of a court of justice which
the sheriff was required to provide for a general sessions of the
whole county. These sessions were to continue for three days
each if business required. 110
In the absence of the Custos Rotulorum who was assumed to
preside, there was no provision for a presiding chairman of the
court, and during the 1.7th century it was probably the frequent
custom to have no chairman at all."' As a practical matter,
one of the justices present could informally act as spokesman
of the court.
While the organization of the court was a comparatively
simple matter, the procedure of quarter sessions as a court of
criminal jurisdiction was quite elaborate. It differed in no
essential manner from that of the higher court of assize held
twice a year in the county by the King's Judges. 1 2 By means
of a grand jury all complaints and offenses requiring attention
11 Lam. Bir., pp. 378-402; Beard, op. cit., pp. 159, 172-173.
'Lam. Eir., pp. 39, 50-51, 381-382, 606; Beard, op. cit., pp. 158, 170171; Webb, op. cit., I, pp. 295-296, 421, 456. The sheriff, his bailiffs,
high constables of hundreds and franchises, the coroners, petty constables, etc., were obliged to attend and to report any offenses or derelictions of duty within their jurisdictions. A sufficient number of
residents from each hundred were provided to furnish the local juries.
The county at large provided a grand jury of leading gentlemen and
qualified freeholders or copyholders (4 Wm.and Mary, c. 24, 1692), for
the trial juries in criminal cases.
mWebb, op. cit., I, pp. 296, 433; Bund, op. cit., xxx-xxxJ.
"ebb,
op. cit., 1,pp. 296, 446.
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were investigated and their presentments and indictments made
to the court. Upon the return of indictments, some cases were
removed from the justices' courts to the King's courts, either
for want of sessions' jurisdiction to try them as in treason
or misprision of treason, or by the interposition of writs of
certiorari issued by the King's Judges at the instance of aggrieved parties. 113 If the accused were present and confessed
the charge in court, no process for his appearance nor any trial
was necessary to be had, the accused being sentenced at the discretion of the court. 114 If the indicted person stood trial in
some exceptional cases, the trial could proceed by examination
of the accused and the witnesses, or upon certificate of certain
high officials of the King, without a jury. However, the general
course of procedure on traverse or upon arraignment was that
of trial before a jury of twelve men. 115 The accused had the
right of exercising challenges to the jurors, both for cause and
for peremptory reasons. The trial then proceeded in the usual
manner of a criminal trial by jury in the King's court. 116 If
found guilty, the prisoner was sentenced in accordance with
the common law or statutes, or as determined within the discretion of the justices in certain offenses wherein the penalties were
not defined by law. 1 7
The subjects of the justices' jurisdiction included: all
felonies, poisonings, enchantments, sorceries, magic acts, trespasses, forestallings, regratings, engrossings and extortions; persons who ride armed or lie in wait to maim or kill anyone; the
enforcement of the laws as to innkeepers, abuses of weights and
measures, or acting wrongfully in the sale of victuals; the mis'Ibid., pp. 463, 474; Lam. Eir., pp. 396-400, 404-409, 410-484,
608-509, 513-516. The high and petty constables were bound to make
certain presentments to the court, especially of those under the head
of public nuisance and national nuisance, being under the one local
government delicts and under the other such offenses as sedition,
recusancy, disaffection to the dynasty, blasphemy, disorderly drunkenness and public gambling. Individual justices could from their own
knowledge or information make presentments to the sessions, especially concerning the highways. Suggestions and voluntary information, oral or written, from private persons was to be received as but
of force
to move the justice§ to refer the matter for investigation.
14 Lam. Eir., pp. 529-530.
15Ibid., pp. 531-539; Payton, op. cit., xxxviii; Beard, op. cit., p. 161.
"1OLam. Eir., 554-568; 22 Hen. VIII, c. 14; Beard, op. cit., pp. 161162.
""Lam. Eir., pp. 568-572.
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behavior of all sheriffs, bailiffs, stewards, constables and jailers
in their offices; and all other crimes and offenses of which such
justices might or ought lawfully to inquire. 1 " In cases presenting difficult questions as to law or jurisdiction, justices
were cautioned to reserve their decision for the presence and
advice of a judge of one of the benches or of assize. 119 Subject
only to this condition, the jurisdiction of the justices' courts
nominally extended to all felonies and to all crimes except
120
treason.
Justices tried capital offenses at their sessions, especially
throughout the 16th century and to some considerable extent
during the 17th century, and sent many persons to the scaffold
who were executed upon their sentences. 12 ' It was, however,
becoming increasingly customary in the 17th, and became invariably so in the 18th century, to reserve jurisdiction in capital
offenses for assizes.3 22 It seems that the criminal jurisdiction
of justices in the 17th century was undergoing a gradual narrowing from the trial of felony cases to the field of misdemeanors,
although the jurisdiction of the sessions in capital crimes was
not abrogated by law until the 19th century. 23
But however the justices' jurisdiction was narrowing in the
17th century with respect to felonies-which, were very common at that time apd usually punishable with hanging 124 -they
were sufficiently occupied with the lesser crimes and misdemeanors and many offenses peculiar to the time. Offenses coming before them included minor breaches of the peace, petty
theft, receiving stolen goods, bastardy, disorderly drunkenness,
vagabondage, recusancy, and non-conformity. The value limit
between larceny and petit larceny was that above twelve pence
1 Chitty, op. cit., p. 138.
Eir., pp. 49-50; 1 Stephen, op. cit., p. 114.
221Lam. Eir., p. 606; 1 Stephen, op. cit., p. 114.
"'Ibid., pp. 466-468; Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 30-31, 33, 83; Bund,
op. cit., I, xcv-xcviii, pp. 4, 177, 243, 247, 347; Jeaffreson, Middlesex
County Records, II, xvii, pp. 194, 201, 202 (2)-208, III, xxvii-xxviii,
pp. 78, 83-84, 114-115, 117, 121 (2), 199, 226, 286, 290, 376; North Riding
Records Yorks, V, pp. 77, 79, 84, 87, 143, 146, 154, 158. Cf. Jeaffreson,
op cit., II, xvii-xxii, and III, xviii-xxiii.
I-Iamilton, op. cit., pp. 160, 236-240; Lam. Eir., p. 553; c Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 293.
"'Lam. Eir., p. 553; 1 Stephen, op. cit., p. 114; Howard, King's
Peace and English Peace Magistracy, pp. 55-56; 5 and 6 Vie., c. 38
(1842).
I-Between the ten years 6 and 15 James I, 704 persons were
hanged in Middlesex County. See Jeaffreson, op. cit., II, xvii.
ILam.
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for the former, 1 25 a limit amazingly low but probably compensated for in a tendency on the part of the justices to undervalue
stolen goods in order to save the culprit from hanging. Not
only was the stealing of goods above twelve pence in value a
felony, but the repetition of offenses in petit larceny was also
so treated, 12 6 likewise incorrigible roguery, or repeated
vagrancy. 127 While petty thieves were whipped for the first offense, repeated offenders were considered to deserve hanging
and this penalty was inflicted on both men and women, if not
commonly in the sessions in the 17th century yet very frequently
in the assizes. 128 At this time, corporal penalties in great variety
were inflicted by the sessions not only for the now recognized
misdemeanors, but also for many offenses whose affront to society
129
was peculiar to the day and age.
In the 17th century neither in nor out of sessions were the
justices vested with a general power of summary jurisdiction,
nor with any such special power except in the instances wherein
it was conferred by statute.'2 0 Even for offenses summarily
cognizable, the maximum penalties were fixed by law, leaving
only a minimIm of discretion.' 31 The powers of justices were
too well defined to allow much freedom in practice. They were,
moreover, warned not to "play the Chancellor.' 1 32 Even for
very trivial offenses, the want of merit in charges had to be
very plain in order for the justices to dismiss the charges. In
doubtful cases they referred the matter to quarter sessions for
further investigation and bound over the prisoner by recognizance for his appearance there and his good behavior meanLam. Eir., p. 422.
Hamilton, op. cit., p. 34.
2- Peyton, op. cit., xxvii.
"Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 30-34; 1 Stephen, op. cit., pp. 466-468.
About 1600, the difference of jurisdiction between sessions and assizes
seems to have been very small. (Hamilton, p. 30.)
22 Aside from occasional imprisonment, among the penalties most
frequently meted out were: the stocks, the pillory, the ducking stool
for scolds, mutilation, branding, and whipping as the most common.
The imposition of a money fine was a customary penalty for a wide
range of offenses. In some cases as of offenses in recusancy or in nonconformity the penalty was a heavy fine or an alternative of imprisonment upon refusal to pay. See Hamilton, op. cit., pp. 178-181, 258,
31-34, 159-160; Lam. Eir., 442-444; Peyton, op. cit., xxvi-xxxiv, xl,
p. 99.
"' Bund, op. cit., xv.
"'Webb, op. cit., I, pp. 281-282; Peyton, op. cit., xlvii.
2Lam. ir., pp. 57-58.
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time. 133 In cases where no statute expressly gave the justices
power to bind over, they were limited to admonishing the party
and if this admonition were neglected, justices could present
such neglect at sessions where a bill might be found and the
accused tried by jury. 34 The justices' practical influence in
such cases was probably wider than their powers and likely to
secure efficacious heed to warnings.
Occasionally statutes authorized one justice, and in other
cases two justices, to inflict penalties of different kinds for various kinds of offenses. The policy seems to have been to enable
them to deal with offenses in the nature of trifling nuisances or
disturbances, jurisdiction in the more serious offenses being reserved for juries. 135 Such. statutes generally prescribed fines
as penalties to be collected for the use of the poor fund, and
provided imprisonment or other penalty for default of payment.
The justices determined fact from their own view of some
such offenses, as seeing tippling, or hearing swearing, or upon
the testimony of two witnesses (one alone being sufficient for
some offenses), or upon confession in any case, depending upon
the particular statute violated. 136 Examples of the kind of offenses dealt with summarily by a single justice were: cases of
pilfering from orchards or lands,13 7 not repairing to church
every Sunday, 38 drunkenness,1 39 continuing drinking or tippling in an inn or alehouse,140 cursing and swearing,' 4' keeping
an unlicensed alehouse by allowing tippling or continual drinking, 1 42 and offenses against the Sabbath. 14 3 Offenses summarily
Bund, op. cit., xv, xxxiii-xxxiv.
xxxi; Lam Eir., p. 46.
1 Stephen, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
'Webb,
op. cit., I, pp. 300-301.
13,43 Eliz., c. 7". Penalty: whipping
"8 3 Jac. I, c. 4, s. 27. A fine of 12d for each offense or Imprisonment until payment
uS 4 Jac. I, c. 5, 3, 2, extended by 21 Jac. I, e. 7, s. 3.
A fine of 5S
for each offense, or if not paid the stocks for 6 hours, and for a second
offense bound also for good behavior as if convicted in sessions.
14 Jac. I, c. 5, s. 4, extended by 21 Jac. I, c. 7, s. 2. A fine of
3s. 4d for each offense, or if not paid the stocks for 4 hours.
14 21 Jac. I, c. 20. A fine of 12d for each offense, or if not paid
the stocks for 3 hours in cases of offenders above 12 years; if under
12 years the fine of 12d to be paid or the offender to be whipped.
IU 1 Jac. I, c. 9, extended by 1 Car. I, c. 4.
A fine of 10s or offender
committad to jail until payment. Undermeasuring ale or beer sold
was alike cognizable, with a fine of 20s or commitment to jail until
payment.
1""1 Car. I, c. 1, and 3 Car. I, c. 1. The first prohibits Sunday
'Ibid.,
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cognizable by two justices were such as: cases of assaults by
servants upon their masters, 144 certain offenses under the game
laws, 145 and making of deceitful cloth. 146 However, there were
but few statutes giving summary powers to justices in force at
the time, and a court of petty sessions administering a summary
jurisdiction had not yet developed in the 17th century. 147
The work of justices in cooperation with the central government and under the orders and control of the Privy Council
constituted a large part of their activities in the 17th as well as
in the preceding century. This work included the performance
of duties of two general classes: (1) duties more directly concerned in cooperation with the national government; and (2)
duties more especially concerned with the local administration
in the county of the central government's policies as affecting
the inhabitants. Examples of the first were the assisting in
raising the quotas of purveyance, subsidies, loans, sales of privy
seals, quotas of men, equipment, and supplies for the military
and naval service, and in the carrying out of political and ecclesiastical policies of the state. Examples of the second were
the cooperation of the justices with the Privy Council in the
regulation of "reasonable" prices and prevention of speculation
in food-stuffs, the restraint of badgers, the regulation of wages
and industry, the supervision and relief of the poor, the repression of vagabonds, idlers and fomentors of sedition and
meetings for sports, pastimes, bear-baiting, bull-baiting, interludes,
common plays, etc. A fine of 3s.4d on every offender or in default of
payment the stocks for 3 hours. The second prohibits carriers or
drovers traveling on Sunday under penalty of 20s for each offense, or
butchers killing or selling meat on Sunday under penalty of 6s.8d for
each offense, with rewards out of fines to informers, and fines recoverable by execution or suit of any citizen.
1"5 Eliz., c. 4, s. 21. The penalty was imprisonment for one year
or less at discretion of these justices, with a power of sessions at discretion to inflict further punishment not extending to life or limb.
Destroying pheasants, par14 1 Jac. I, c. 27, and 7 Jac. I, c. 11.
tridges, pigeons, hares, etc., drew a fine of 20s for each offense or imprisonment for 3 months. Keeping dogs or nets to take pheasants,
dealing for sale in any deer, hare, partridge, or pheasant were offenses
variously penalized by fines of 10s to 40s, with one moiety of fine to
citizen who collected by suit and the other moiety to poor fund. Jail
sentences or alternative fines were prescribed for hawking at or killing
of a pheasant or partridge, or the taking such with setting dogs, nets,
etc., out of season.
1110
21 Jac. I, c. 18. A forfeiture of £5 for each offense of mixing
other things with wool in woolen cloth or commitment to jail until
payment.
1111 Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 294.
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revolution, and other economic and social control measures of
the Council.148
The justices administered the civil business of their counties in much the same way they handled judicial matters. No
sharp distinction was made. All decisions whether concerned
with the civil or criminal administration were in legal' theory
required to be based upon evidence and made in strict accordance with the law of the land. Not only was the county business
largely carried on in the court of quarter sessions, intermingled
with transactions of the criminal business, but the supervision
of all county business was cast in a judicial mold. In the nature
of the justices' authority they were concerned with the obligations of the individual under the law. Hence in the execution
of 17th century county business, the numerous duties and obligations of citizens and local officers were enforced through the
process of presentment and indictment in the quarter sessions.
By this means the justices supervised the whole administration
of county government. 149

'Beard,

op. cit., pp. 124-138; Saunders, op. cit., xxi, xxv-xxxix, xL

An interesting account for the 17th century of the cooperation of the
justices with and under the various governments is afforded also in
Mr. Hamilton's book. A remarkable feature is the showing of the
stability of the tenure of this official class throughout the vicissitudes
of changing governments. The traditional conservatism and legal
training of the justicei as a class evidently contributed to the recognition of the value of their service to the successive governments.
'"Webb, op. cit., I, pp. 281, 296, 437, 445; 1 Holdsworth, op. cit,
p. 293.

